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ABSTRACT
This paper illustrates the importance of the fiscal framework for
monetary analysis by discussing three separate issues.I begin by examining
how the fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated
with different steady state rates of money growth. This includes a summary
of research that I have presented elsewhere and comments on several additional
aspects of the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of
monetary policy.
The second section deals with the short—run impact of changes in
monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicates the economy's
response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure on
the central bank's choice of monetary policies. Because fiscal structures
affect the costs and benefits of monetary policies, they are likely to
influence the policies adopted.
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I am very honored by your invitation to present this lecture. I
will use this occasion to discuss a subject that has been an important focus of
my own work in the past decade and that lies at the boundary of nacroeconomics
and public finance: the fiscal framework of monetary policy.
The failure to deal explicitly with the fiscal framework of monetary
policy is a serious shortcoming of modern monetary theory. My purpose in this
lecture is to advocate that the theory and practice of monetary economics devote
more attention to the ways in which the tax structure influences the impact of
monetary policy.
I find it very strange that virtually all studies of' monetary policy,
empirical as well as theoretical, ignore the system of tax rules within which
monetary policy has its influence. Ignoring taxes was no doubt justifiable when
tax rates were very low. Fifty years ago, most individuals paid no income tax
at all and the median tax rate among those who did pay tax was less than 5 per-
cent. By contrast, in the 1910s individuals could pay tax on investment income
at rates up to TO percent and taxes took more than two—thirds of the real income
of nonfinancial corporate capital.
Aparticularly important aspect of the tax system is its failure to
distinguish between nominal and real magnitudes. Monetary policies that alter
theprice level or the rate of inflation therefore change effective tax rates
and alter the incentives to engage in different types of activities. Thus, even
if the conditions required for the neutrality or superneutrality of money would
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be satisfied in the absence of taxes, the fiscal framework would effectively
destroy both neutrality and superneutrality.
To avoid misunderstanding, let me say at the outset that I am not
arguingthata full description of an econonr's fiscal structure shouldbe part
ofeverystudy of monetary economics. Including even a rudimentary description
of the fiscal framework would obviously increase the complexity of any study.
In some cases, such complexity can obscure the particular subject of'interest
without changing anything of fundamentalimportance.I do believe, however,
that those who would ignore the fiscal framework must bear the burden of
arguing that such simplification is not misleading. Empiricalstudies that
ignore taxes are particularly suspect.
To illustrate the importance of the fiscal framework for monetary ana-
lysis, I will discuss three separate issues. I will begin by examininghow the
fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated withdifferent
steady state rates of money growth. This will include a summaryof research
that I have presentedelsewhere1 and comments on several additional aspects of
the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of monetary policy.
Thesecond section of rrr,y remarks will deal with the short—run impact
of changes in monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicatesthe
economy's response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure onthe
centralbank's choice of monetary policies. Because fiscal structures affect
the costs and benefits of monetary policies, they are likely to influencethe
policies adopted.
Feldstein (1982) brings together 12 of my papers on this subject.—3—
1. Tax Rules and Monetary Equilibrium
An increase in the stock of moneyinducesa corresponding increase in
the level of prices. Similarly, a permanent increase in the rate of growth of
the money stock induces a corresponding increase in the rate of inflation.
These basic steady—state properties follow directly from the proportionality of
money demand to the price level and are not affected by the econonr's fiscal
structure. However, the interaction of tax rules and price inflation does
change the equilibrium of the real econony in a wide variety of ways. This sec-
tion first comments briefly on the non--neutrality of one—time changes in the
money stock and then discusses in riore detail the effects of sustained increases
in the growth of money.
The most widely understood effect of inflation on tax liabilities is
the result of the progressive structure of tax rates. A general rise in the
level of prices and incomes shifts taxpayers into higher tax brackets and
thereby raises the overall effective tax rate. With the existing structure of
U.S. tax rates, a 10 percent increase in money incomes raises tax revenue by 16
percent, thereby raising the effective tax rate by about 6 percent. Moreover,
the shift of individuals to higher tax brackets raises marginal tax rates and
thereby lowers the net of tax wage rate and the net of tax rate of interest.
Thus, a one—time increase in the stock of money is far from neutral in our economy.
To simplify the discussion in the remainder of this paper, I will
ignore the bracket creep effect of the progressive structure of taxes. I will
assume instead that the tax brackets are fully indexed. I will, however, com-
ment on the implication of the fact that individuals do face different tax rates
and, in the third section, I will discuss the effect of nonindexation on the
determination of monetary policy.——
Evenif tax brackets are fully indexed, the tax system is very sen-
sitive to inflation because it fails to distinguish between real capital income
and nominal capital income. Recall for comparison what happens in an econori
without taxes when a permanent rise in the growth rate of money causes an
increase in the steady state inflation rate. If the demand for money is completely
interest inelastic, the nominal rate of interest rises by the rate of inflation.
This leaves the real rate of interest and all other real magnitudes in the eco—
nonr unchanged. This is the superneutrality property that weassociate with
Irving Fisher. AsTobin(1965)andMundell (1963) have emphasized, this super—
neutrality is lost if the demand for money is interest sensitive. The rise in
the nominal interest rate then causes a reduction in the demand for money and a
substitution of real capital for money in individual portfolios. The resulting
capital deepening in production reduces the real rate of interest. Although
this effectistheoretically correct,itis likely to be very small in practice.
SinceMl,which is a broader measure of money than is appropriate for the
Mundell-Tobin theory, is only five percent of total private wealth, the scope
forportfolio substitution is extremely limited. I shall thereforeignore this
effectand assume a completely inelastic demand for money in order to contrast
the tax effectswith the superneutrality that would otherwise characterize
egui 1 ib rium.
One ofthe most important features of theU.S. tax system is that
taxableincome reflects nominal interest receipts and expenses instead of real
interest receipts and expenses. Before looking at other complexities of the tax
system, it is helpful to consider an econorrr in which taxable income is
correctly measured in all respects except that nominal rather than real interest—5—
receipts and expenditures are included.' Assume for the moment that savings are
not affected by the rate of return that savers receive and that all saving is
absorbed in private capital formation. This is sufficient to insure that the
steady state capital intensity remains constant and therefore that the real
marginal product of capital, f', is unchanged.
The equilibrium condition for a competitive firm is that the real net—
of—tax marginal product of capital, (l—t)f' where t is the corporate tax rate,
is equal to the real net—of--tax rate of interest. If the nominal rate of
interest is i, the net—of—tax nominal rate is (l—T)i and the net of tax real
rate is (l—T)i—1r, where ii is the rate of inflation. It is important to note
that the tax law permits deduction of the nominal interest rate so that the tax
deduction is TI. The equilibrium condition is thus
(1) (1—r)f' =(1—T)i—1'.




The individual lender who provides capital to the firm must, of
course, pay tax on the full nominal interest rate. The real net return received
by the individual, rN, is thus equal to the real interest rate, i—it, minus the
tax on the nominal interest rate, Gi, where 0 Is the marginal rate of personal
income tax. Thus,
1This is the case examined in Feldstein (1976) whichappears as Chapter 3
of Feldstein (1982).—6—
(3) r =(1—0)1—ir.
Substitutingequation 2 for i yields
(1k) r =(1—0)f'+_______fl.
Thereal net interest rate received by the individual lender is thus affected by
inflation unless the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate are equal,
i.e., unless the benefit that corporations get from deducting the full nominal
interest payment is offset exactly by the penalty to individuals that arises
from paying tax on the full nominal interest receipt.
Since individuals have different personal tax rates, they will be
affected differently by inflation. Equation 1 shows that individuals with low
marginal tax rates (0 <t) andtax exempt investors like universities and pen-
sion funds (0 =o)will benefit frominflationwhile investors with high rErgi—
naltaxrates (0 >T) willfind that inflation lowers their real rate of return.
If we now drop the assumption that saving is not sensitive to the real
net rate of return that savers receive, we see that a change in the rate of
monetary expansion will lead to a change in capital intensity. To see the
importance of this, consider for a nment the extreme case in which all personal
tax rates are equal and the supply of saving is infinitely elastic at the real
net interest rate (1—0)f'0 where f'0 is the marginal product of capital inthe
absence of inflation. With inflation at rate itthemarginal product of capital








If T is greater than 0, inflation reduces the equilibrium marginal product of
capital and therefore increases the capital intensity of the economy.
Although these simple calculations are sufficient to illustrate the
important non—neutrality of a sustained (and therefore anticipated) monetary
expansion, let me warn you not to take the specific results seriously because we
have not yet considered other important ways in which tax rules affect the
economy's monetary equilibrium. Among the most significant of these is the tax
treatment of depreciation and inventory costs.
Existing tax law bases depreciation allowances on the original or
"historic" cost of an asset with no adjustment for the increase in the price
level since the asset was acquired. When the price level increases, the depre-
ciation component of costs is understated. Taxable profits are therefore
overstated and the effective tax rate rises. Similarly, the use of the first—
in—first—out (FIFO) method of inventory valuation also causes an understatement
of costs when there is inflation and therefore an overstatement of taxable
income. These effects are very large; a few years ago, Larry Summers and I
(Feldstein and Summers, 1979) calculated that the excess taxes due to the use of
historic cost depreciation and inflated inventory profits accounted for 5per-
cent of the taxes paid by nonfinancial corporations.
If we approximate this extra tax burden per unit of capital as propor-
tional to the rate of inflation, the real net—of—tax rate of return to the firm
becomes (l—r)f'—Air where A measures the effect of inflation on net—of—tax profi——8—
tability. Empirical calculations suggest that under the tax law prevailing
before 1981, A wasapproxinRtelyone—fourth (see the appendix to chapter 11 in
Feldstein, 1982.) The firm's equilibrium condition requires equating the real
net—of--taxreturn to the firm to the real net—of—tax rate of interest:
(7) (l—T)f'—Alr=(1—t)j—w.








Equation 9 shows that inflation raises the real rate of interest if t > A and
lowers it if T < A. The explanation of this is simple: the real rate of
interest that firms can pay with a given marginal product of capital is
depressed by inflationto the extent that itinduces extra taxes because of
historic cost depreciation and FIFO inventory accounting (hence the negative
A term) but is increased by inflation because nominal interest payments are
deductible in the calculation of taxable interest (the positive effect of T).
Equation 8 shows that if A and T were equal, the nominal interest rate
would rise roughly point—for—point with the inflation rate. Thus Irving
Fisher's equilibrium relation could be true in an econonr with distortionary
taxes, but because of numerically offsetting factors rather than because of any
inherent tendency toward a constant real rate of return.
It is important, nreover, to note that a constant real rate of
interest nans that the real net—of—tax rate of interest received by taxable







Tosee how large this effect is, note that if t6,thereal net rate of interest
falls by A per percentage point of inflation; if we take asa a reasonable
approximation that the marginal product of capital is f' =.12,that 0 == 0.5
and that A =0.25,a 12 percent rate of inflation reduces the real net return in
half, from six percent to three percent.
The fall in the net return caused by inflation implies that a
sustained monetary expansion will change the equilibrium capital intensity and
therefore the marginal product of capital. Thus even when T =Athe full
general equilibrium response to inflation contradicts Fisher's prediction that
the equilibrium nominal interest rate rises by the rate of inflation.
A further word of caution. The results that I have derived assume
that firms are 100 percent debt financed at the margin'. If firms are 100 per-
cent equity financed or use a mixture of debt and equity (Feldstein, Green and
Sheshinski, l9T8) the quantitative results can be quite different. For my pur-
pose today, however, it is not necessary to derive definitive results. It is
sufficient to establish that, even if money demand is completely inelastic,
'See Stiglitz (1976) for an explicit model of thissort, although not in the
context of inflation. For a more general model of the debt —equitychoice, see
Auerbach (1982).—10—
changes inthe steady—state rate of moneygrowtharefarfromneutralin their
effect on the real equilibrium of the econoxxr.
Lest this seem like a lot of effort to demolish an intellectual straw
man,let me remind youthat, except for Tobin—Mundell liquidity effects, the
long—rundichotonr between the money growth rate and the real econoxmj is assumed
in virtually all of the best work in monetary theory, including such outstanding
examples as Tobin(1963) and Sargent(1980)1. Even more significant are the
statisticalstudies like Earro (1977) and Faina(1975) thattakethe neutrality
ofanticipated money growth as a theoretically Justified null hypothesis.
Similarly, when Schiller (1980) investigated whether Federal Reserve policy
could alter the real interest rate, his focus was too narrow. By altering the
rate of inflation, the Fed alters the difference between the net—of—tax real
profitability of investment and the net—of—tax real cost of funds.
The adverse effect of inflation on the profitability of business
investments causes a shift of the capital stock away from plant and equipment
and into owner—occupied housing (Feldstein, 1982, chapter 6).Infact, during
the 1970s the share of residential construction in total net investment
increased and the real value of single family homes rose sharply because the
relative stock of housing had not yet increased to its new equilibrium level
(Poterba, 1980).
A sinillar disequilibrium response was also reflected in the behavior
of share prices. In the very long run, share prices rmist rise at the same rate
as the price level in general. In the short run, however, an increase in the
'An interesting counterexample is a very recent paper by Modigliani and
Papademos (1982).—11—
equilibrium inflation rate depresses the expected after—tax return on equity
capital relative to other portfolio investments and therefore reduces the market
price of corporate shares (Feldstein, 1982, Chapters 10 and ii).This is a tem-
porary condition which is reversed gradually as a reduction in the relative size
of the corporate capital stock permits the real pretax rate of return to rise.2
To understand the full interaction of inflation and the tax system, it
is necessary to look beyond the basic tax rules affecting interest payments,
depreciation, capital gains and inventories. The tax code contains a nrriad of
special provisions affecting different types of capital income that maybe
influenced by inflation: there are special rules for banks, insurance com-
panies, timber, oil and gas, farmers, utilities, etc.I am certain that there
are many such influences of which I am unaware. To illustrate the importance of
such special features, I will describe the tax rules that apply to the portfolio
income of life insurance companies.3
In the United States, individuals pay life insurance premiums with
dollars and the insurance benefits subsequently received are not part
income. If the insurance companies were not subject to tax on their
income, savings in the form of life insurance would effectively be
a consumption tax basis, i.e., there would be no tax on the interest
this form of saving. This was almost the situation immediately after
the current special income tax rules for insurance companies were
That law provides that an insurance company would pay no tax on its
'Share prices are also depressed by the fact that inflationproduces
nominal capital gains that are subject to tax when the stock is sold.
2See Summers (1982) for an explicit model of theadjustment process in a
rational expectations general equilibrium model.








portfolio income, savings in the form of life insurance would effectively be
treated on a consumption tax basis, i.e., there would be no tax on the interest
earned on this form of saving. This was almost the situation immediately after
1959 when the current special income tax rules for insurance companies was
enacted. That law provides that an insurance company would pay no tax on its
portfolio income if that income was just enough to provide the nominal rate of
return that it had promised to its policyholders. The promised rate, which is
controlled by the state insurance commissioners, changes very little and is
still less than five percent.
If an insurance company earns more than the promised rate, it must pay
tax at the corporate rate on a portion of its capital income. That jxrtion is
determined by an archane rule, the Menge formula, that provides that the taxed
portion is ten times the difference between the rate of return on the company's
portfolio and its promised rate of return. Thus, if a company earns6 percent
on its protfolio and has a promised rate ofpercent, it pays tax at the cor-
porate rate on 20 percent of its portfolio income; equivalently, it pays tax on
all its prtfolio income at 20 percent of the corporate rate or about a 9 per-
cent tax rate.
As long as the interest rate on the bonds held by insurance companies
was close to the low promised rate set by the regulators, saving in the form of
life insurance was virtually tax free. This not only encouraged life insurance
as a form of saving but also, by providing a tax free vehicle for life cycle
saving, encouraged saving in general.
Consider now what happens as inflation raises the rate of interest.
With a 10 percent inflation rate and a l).t percent bond interest rate, the Menge
formulaindicates thatthe insurance company would be taxed at 100 percent of—13—
thecorporate tax rate on its total portfolio income. Inflation means that life
insurance is no longer an essentially untaxed way to do life cycle saving.
Moreover, saving in the form of life insurance would have a lower after—tax
yield than direct investment in the same bond portfolio for anyone whose per-
sonal tax rate was less than the corporate tax rate.
The special tax rules affecting life insurance thus are another 'way in
which an inflationary monetary policy reduces the rate of capital accumulation.
I think the problem of life insurance taxation is also a good indication of the
complexity of adjusting the tax laws to eliminate the effect of changes in the
rateof inflation. Although fifteen years of inflation has been long enough to
reduce substantially the rate of life insurance saving, ithasnot been long
enoughforthe politicalprocess to find a way to remedy these problems.
Until now, I have limited my analysis to the effects of monetary
policy, in a closed economy. When the broader perspective of an open economy is
considered, the interaction between inflation and tax rules also influences
international capital flows and therefore international trade. In an open eco—
nomy without taxes, a steady state increase in inflation in the home country
would cause its nominal interest rate to rise by the increase in the rate of
inflation. Because of purchasing power parity, the value of its currency would
depreciate at that same rate relative to the currencies of all other countries.
A foreign lender who buys bonds of the home country would thus receive the same
rate of interest net of exchange loss as he had before the increase in infla-
tion. Inflation provides no incentive for international capital flows.
To see one way in which taxes mightchange the analysis, I will follow
Hartman(1979)and consider an economy in which the only imperfection in the tax
systemis to include nominalinterest instead of real interest. With that tax114
rule,the nominal interest rate in the home countrywould rise not by the
increasein the rate of inflation but by that rate divided by one minus the cor-
porate tax rate (di/dif =i/(i—r)).Witha corporate tax rate of one—half, the
nominal interest rate wouldriseby twice the increase in inflation. Purchasing
power parity would still implythatin equilibrium the currency depreciated at
the rate of inflation. The rate of interest to the foreign lender who buyshome
country bonds, net of currency depreciation, thus rises by the increasein the
rate of inflation.
This is clearly not an equilibrium situation. Capital will flow into
the home country until the rate of interest net of currency depreciation is the
same thereas in the rest of the world. Capital flow achieves equilibrium
byincreasing the capital intensity in the home country (thus driving downthe
real rate of return) and lowering the capital intensity in the rest of theworld
(thereby raising the real rate of return elsewhere). The equilibrium occurs
when the difference between the marginal products of capital at home and abroad
is equal to the rate of inflation.
Although this is an oversimplified picture of taxes and international
capitalmovements, it issufficient to show how taxes cause an inflationary
monetaryexpansion to haverealeffects on the distribution of the world capital
stockand therefore on capital flowsand trade patterns.
Beforeleaving the framework of the steady—state behavior of the eco-
nomy, I want to comment briefly on the implication ofthe fiscal framework for
thetheory of optimal inflation and the optimal quantity of money. Milton
Friedman (1969) pointed out that a negative rate of inflation equal to the real
rate of interest would make the nominal interest ratezero and would thereby
reducethe opportunity cost of holding money to its zero cost of supply. Any—15—
higher rate of inflation would in effect imply a tax on holding money balances
and would thereby move the econoxiw away from an efficient equilibrium.
Friedman's negative rate of inflation would of course require a con-
tinuing decline in the money stock which would in turn require a continuing
surplus in the government budget. Friedman's condition would thus be optiuRl
only if there were a lump sum tax to produce the necessary revenue without
introducing any distortion. Phelps (1973) subsequently noted that without lump
sum taxes it would be optimal to have a higher rate of inflation since the net
money creation (or the reduced rate of decline of the money stock) would permit
a reduction in other distorting taxes.
The optimal rate of inflation and the optimal quantity of money become
a more complex problem when we recognize that inflation distorts the taxation of
capital income. Because of the fiscal structure, a higher rate of inflation has
the advantage of producing tax revenue (if the effects of understated depre-
ciation and inventory costs outweigh the deduction of nominal interest income)
and of shifting portfolios from capital to money (thereby offsetting the usual
bias against holding non—interest—bearing money balances). At the same time, of
course, the interaction of inflation and the fiscal structure reduces the incen-
tive to save and distorts the allocation of capital among different uses. The
optimal steady state rate of inflation can only be established by a quantitative
evaluation of all these effects.
2. Tax Rules and Monetary Transition
Thefiscal structure of an econonw affects not only the steady state
equilibrium associated with anyleveland rate of growth of the moneystockbut
alsoinfluences the character of the transition from one steady rate of money—i6—
growth to another. Since the evolution of expectations about monetary policy
are a critical determinant of the transition process but are not central to
understanding the influence of tax rules, I will assume that expectations adjust
immediately to the new reality. To be specific, I will consider the case in
which the money stock has been growing at 10 percent a year for a long period of
time when the central bank announces that henceforth the money growth rate will
be only 1 percent. Everyone immediately and correctly adjusts his expected rate
of moneygrowth to 4percentfor theindefinite future.
Consider first what ou1d happenin aneconon with no taxes. The 6
percentage point decline in the money growth rate implies a 6 percentage point
decline in the steady state inflation rate. Th keep the real interest rate
unchanged, the nominal interest rate must also decline by six percentage points.
This "superneutral" response to the decline in money growth is possible only if
the demand for money is completely insensitive to the interest rate. With any
interestelasticity, the lower nominal interest rate causes an increase in the
demand for money. The increased money demand means a lower capital intensity
and a higher real rate of interest. As I noted earlier, however, the very small
size of the non—interest—bearing money stock relative to the capital stock makes
this Tobin—Mundell effect on capital intensity and on the equilibrium real
interest rate very small.
Although the interest sensitivity of money demand has only a small
effect on steady state equilibrium, it can have a powerful effect on the tran-
sition process. To satisfy the increased demand for real money balances at the
lower nominal interest rate, the price level must decline immediately. Thus the
announcement of a lower rate of growth of money implies an equal decline in the—17—
nominal interest rate only if the price level can drop immediately by enough to
reduce the demand for nominal rroney balances to the available supply.
In reality, prices are not conletely flexible downward and the price
leveldoes not fall fast enough to permit the real interest rate to remain
unchanged. Instead, the nominal interest rate must remain high to balance the
supply and demand for money. The result is a rise in the real rate of interest
and this high real rate induces a decline in economic activity.Thelover level
ofeconomic activity and the decline in inflation that it causes both reduce the
demand for nney but not by enough to permit an immediate return of the real
interest rate to its natural level. As long as the real interest rate is above
its natural rate, there will be slack in the economy and therefore downward
pressure on inflation and interest rates. The high real rate is thus eventually
self—correcting.
The slow fall in the short—term rate keeps the long term rate above
its eventual equilibrium value even if expectations about declining inflation
are held with certainty. This high level of the long—term rate follows directly
from the fact that, in the absence of uncertainty, the long rate is an average
of the future short rates. Thus if the short rate is expected to decline from
13 percent to 7percentat the rate of one percent a year and then to remain at
7percent,a new 10—year bond will have a yield to maturity of 9percent.
The increase in real rates of interest during the transition period
impliesthat a decline in the rate of nney growthis far from neutral even in a
taxlesseconomy. The presence of a tax system complicates and exacerbates this
non—neutrality.
As I emphasized earlier, because the tax system is not indexed, the
rate of moneygrowth affects thereal rate ofinterest and the real after—tax—i8—
profitability of different activities. A change in therate ofnxney growth
therefore induces a shift of resources among different industries. In par-
ticular, because the interaction of taxes and inflation penalizes investment in
depreciable plant and equipment relative to investment in owner—occupied
housing, a permanent decrease in the rate of money growth induces a shift of
resources out of housing and into plant and equipment investment. Similarly,
because inflation reduces the after—tax yield on saving, a decrease in the rate
of money growth induces a shift from consumption to saving.
Although the intersectoral shift of resources induced by a change in
money growth could in principle occur without any unemployment, thereduced
demand for the products of some sectors is likely to involve some unemployment
before the workers in those sectors find employment elsewhere. Unemployment
would arise naturally in this process if there is an advantage to devoting full
time to searching for a new job. The availability of unemployment benefits that
drastically reduce the opportunity cost of remainingunemployed tends to raise
thereservation wage of those who must change jobs and therefore to increase
significantly the duration of unemployment.1
It is interesting to contrast this view of the way in which a reduc-
tion in the money growth rate causes unemployment with the theory developed many
years ago by Freidrich Hayek. Hayek also argued that a decline ininflation
would cause a downturn in economic activity because the lower rate of inflation
would cause some sectors to contract. More specifically, however, Hayek believed
that business investment would expand during an inflationary period because bank
1See Feldstein and Poterba (1982) for a discussion of the effect of
unemployment insurance on reservation wages and the average duration of
unemployment.—19—
credit looked cheap and profits were artificially increased by the fact that
price increases temporarily exceeded wage increases. The essence of Hayek's
argument was therefore that inflation induced a misperception of investment
incentives which in turn led to a misallocation of capital. Reversing that
misallocation caused the unemployment that accompanied a reduction of inflation.
With an unindexed tax system, a misallocation of capital can occur
during inflation without any misperception. The change in inflation changes
relative tax burdens and therefore induces a new allocation of capital. It is
interesting also to note that the misallocation of capital caused by the U.S.
inflation of the 1970s was opposite in direction to that predicted by Hayek so
that net investment in plant and equipment declined during the decade as a share
of GNP.
The effect of the tax system on the econorxr's transition from a high
inflation rate to a low inflation rate is not just a function of its unindexed
character. Even a completely indexed tax system would affect the transition
process if the reduction in inflation caused some firms to experience a tem-
porary period of accounting losses. The high real interest rates, the depressed
level of economic activity, and the reallocation of activity that accompany a
reduction in the inflation rate all imply that some firms will have an unprofi-
table period.
Under conventional tax rules, a firm's incentive to invest is sharply
reduced during any period in which it has no taxable profits. The reduced
incentive to invest reflects the fact that without taxable profits the firm can-
not take advantage of the investment tax credit or the relatively large depre-
ciation allowances that occur during the first few years of an investment's
life. The tax savings associated with the depreciation and investment tax cre——20—
ditmust be carried forward to future years and are thereby reduced in value.
Thisimplies that the net cost of any investment is increased. In contrast, the
positive income from the investment will occur only in the future when the firm
expects to be fully taxable. breover, since interest payments during the early
years of the investment do not reduce concurrent tax liabilities, theeffective
net interest rate is higher for a nontaxable firm than for a taxable firm.
These distortions arise because the tax system is assymetric in its
treatment of gains and losses. If negative tax liabilities were rebated con-
currently or could becarriedforward with an appropriate rate of interest, this
problem would not arise. itexistingtax law1 increases the cyclical sen-
sitivityofinvestment and makes the impact of monetary policy quite non—neutral
amongfirmsand industries.
3. The Determination of Monetary Policy
Several years ago, I arguedthatmonetary policyinthe 1960s and
1970s had been too expansionary because the monetary authorities failed to
recognize the interaction between inflation and the tax system.The monetary
authorities focused on the interest rate and worried that what they perceived as
a high interest rate 'wasdiscouraginginvestment and depressing economic acti-
vity.In fact, although the nominal interest rate wasrisingduring this
period, the real interest rate showed no trend and the real net—of—tax interest
rate has fallen substantially. The low real net rate of interest increased
'The problem is substantially ameliorated by the "safe harbor leasing rulest'
enactedin 1981 but these are now (July 1982) effectively in abeyance and their
futureisuncertain.
2The argument is summarized in Feldstein (1980).—21—
consumptionand investment in housing by ure than enough to offset the
depressing effect of inflation on investment in plant and equipment.
Since 1979 the Fed has been following a imich sore xronetarist approach
in determining its monetrary policy. The gradual deceleration of the soney
growth rate has become the overriding target of monetary policy. Since interest
rates are no longer a fundamental target, the previous mistakesin interpreting
the interest rate are no longer relevant.
The future evolution of monetary policy is of'course lessclear. The
future Governors of the Federal Reserve maybeless manetarist in their behavior
and may revert to targeting interest rates or nominal GNP or some weighted func-
tion of inflation, unemployment, and other measures of economic performance.
If this happens, how will the fiscal framework influence the futurechoiceof
monetary policy?
It is of course possible that the monetary authorities will continue
to ignore the fiscal effects of monetary policy and might therefore choose poli-
cies that do not achieve their intended results. I want however to examine the
implications of assuming to the contrary that the monetary authorities do
understand the fiscal consequences of alternative monetary policies and take
them into account in their choice of monetary policy. How then might alter-
native fiscal frameworks affect the choices made by the Fed or urged upon it by
the Congress or the administration?
With the tax laws that prevailed in the 1970's, a one—time increase in
the money stock caused a one—time increase in tax revenue as taxpayers were
pushed into higher tax brackets. A sustained increase in the growth rate of the
money stock increased tax revenue continually and, by raising the rate of infla-
tion, discouraged investment in plant and equipment. A government eager to—22—
increase tax revenue in order to eliminate a deficit or to finance increased
government spending might therefore encourage an inflationary monetary policy.
The enthusiasm for raising revenue in this way would however be tempered and
perhaps reversed by recognizing that inflation reduced business investment and
therefore the growth of productivity.
The 1981 tax legislation changed both of these fiscal effects.
Starting in January 1985, the personal income tax is to be indexed: each year
the bracket limits and other nominal amounts in the tax law will be increased in
proportion to the recent rise in the price level. Inflation will therefore no
longer push people into higher tax brackets and increase real tax revenue. The
1981 legislation also provides for a much rrxre rapid tax depreciation of plant
and equipment. All equipment is now written off over at most five years and
with an accelerated schedule equivalent to 150 percent of the five—year
declining balance rate. The rapid tax depreciation increases the after—tax
return to investment at arw inflation rate. Tbreover, since depreciation is so
rapid, an increase in the rate of inflation reduces the real value of the depre-
ciation allowance by much less than it did under the old tax rules when much of
the equipment was depreciated over 15 years or more. Indeed, companies with
moderately high ratios of debt to capital are likely to find that a rise in the
rate of inflation actually increases the incentive to invest.
How does the 1981 tax legislation alter the likely course of monetary
policy? First, indexing the personal tax brackets removes any incentive to use
one—time increases in the money stock as a rmthod of raising revenue through
bracketcreep. Second, since both the "favorable" revenue effect and the
adverse investment effect of a sustained monetary expansion are eliminated, the
effect on the incentive to pursue an inflationary monetary policy isambiguous.—23—
A pessimist might well worry, however, that virtually eliminating one of the
major adverse effects of inflation may cause future governments and Federal
Reserve Boards to pursue a more inflationary nnetary policy.
Future changes in tax rules may make an inflationary monetary policy
seem either nre or less appealing. One such change is now under active con-
sideration in the Congress. The very large deficits projected for the next
several years have induced Congress and the administration to consider alter-
native ways of increasing tax revenue. One proposal is to repeal the indexing
of the personal income tax before it takes effect in 1985. An unindexed tax
system would provide a clear incentive to reduce the projected budget deficits
by increasing the rate of inflation rather than by the politically painful pro-
cess of reducing government spending or increasing tax rates explicitly. The
knowledge that the inflation will not decrease investment and may actually
encourage it would reinforce this temptation to use an expansionary rronetary
policy.
.ConcludingRemarks
My aim in today's lecture has not been to propose or defend any par-
ticular theory about the effect of monetary policy on the economy. Instead, rrrj
purpose has been the more general one of encouraging macroeconomists and mone-
tary theorists to devote attention to the way that the fiscal framework affects
the impact of monetary policy.
The traditional distinction between the specialities of public econo-
mics and macroeconomics is undoubtedly a useful one for advancing research in
both fields. But the growing role of the public sector and of taxes in par—
ticular cannot be ignored in analyzing macroeconomic behavior.I hope that my remarks today will encourage some of those who hear
them or read them later to turn their own attention to this important subject.
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